Employers\u27 Garnishment Policies - Do They Engender Racial Discrimination in Violation of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866? by Vance, Amy S.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 5 | Number 2 Article 6
1977
Employers' Garnishment Policies - Do They
Engender Racial Discrimination in Violation of
Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866?
Amy S. Vance
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amy S. Vance, Employers' Garnishment Policies - Do They Engender Racial Discrimination in Violation of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866?, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 321 (1977).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol5/iss2/6
EMPLOYERS' GARNISHMENT POLICIES-DO
THEY ENGENDER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866?
I. Introduction
Before 1970, employers frequently discharged employees who had
incurred a single wage granishment.' In that year, Congress placed
limitations on this practice through the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act.2 At present, twenty-six jurisidctions have enacted legis-
lation with more stringent requirements.' The remaining juris-
dictions, however, provide little4 or no' protection, and many
1. See In re Jackson, 424 F.2d 1220, 1221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nor. Jackson v.
International Harvester Co., 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970).
3. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-5-106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361(h) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3509 (1974); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-584 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (1961) (discharge provision not necessary since 100
percent of wages of head of family exempt from garnishment); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-32(1)
(Special Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 28-35-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IND. ANN. STAT. § 24-4.5-
5-106 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 642.21.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2311 (Cum. Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A § 5.106 (Supp. 1976); MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 600.4015 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.61(1) (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 41.305.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5252 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-362 (1969) (discharge provision not necessary since 100 percent of debtor's wages earned
sixty days before garnishment order is received, are exempt when it can be proved they are
necessary for the support of the family); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 5-106 (1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 23.185(7) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 886 (1966) (discharge provisions not neces-
sary since garnishment not permitted on wages); CODE OF S.C. § 8-800-336 (Cum. Supp.
1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-20-12 (1967) (discharge provision not necessary since
100 percent of wages earned sixty days before the garnishment order is received, are exempt
when it can be proved they are necessary for the support of the family); TEX. CONST. art. 16,
§ 28 (current wages for personal services not subject to garnishment), see also TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3165 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
46A-2-131 (1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 425-110(1) (1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-106 (Supp.
1975).
4. The following state statutes provide minimal restrictions, most no harsher than the
federally imposed limitation of prohibiting discharge for only one garnishment: CAL. LABOR
CODE § 2929(b) (West Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-303 (Cum. Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. § 62-88 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.140 (1970); MD. COMM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 15-603 (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.030(5) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §
25-1558(6) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (L) (Page Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §
70B-5-106 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29(f) (1970).
5. Fourteen states maintain no restrictions on discharge whatsoever. They are: Alaska,
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employers continue to suspend or discharge employees who incur
large debts and multiple garnishments.1
Within the past several years, these employer policies have been
subject to legal challenge by minority groups who claim that the
policies are racially discriminatory. These groups insist that any
practices which penalize poor workers will disproportionately affect
racial minorities, who are more apt to be poor than white workers.
Most policies have been contested under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.1
Several litigants have also claimed that such practices violate 42
U.S.C. § 1981,8 a modern codification of section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,1 which forbids racial'" discrimination in the making and
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
6. There is little in the way of statistics to indicate on a national average how many
employers maintain these restrictive policies. However, facts may be garnered from a 1967
study, D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974). Of the
1,331 defaulting debtors who were surveyed in the cities of New York, Chicago, Detroit, and
Philadelphia, Id. at 8, 54 percent of those interviewed stated that their employers maintained
garnishment rules. Id. at 237.
7. Section 730(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970),
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Id.
9. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1976). The origin of section 1981 was vigor-
ously disputed until the Supreme Court decision of Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1972). Prior to this decision, many courts had held that section 1981 was
derived solely from the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 816, 16 Stat. 144, which was passed
after the fourteenth amendment, and thus required a showing of state action before a cause
of action could be established. See Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Winterhalter v. Three Rivers
Motors Co., 312 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Evans v. Local 2127, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The Supreme Court in Tillman traced
the language of section 1981 and its companion provision section 1982, prohibiting racial
discrimination in the conveyance of property, to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27. See 410 U.S. 439-40 (1973). Finding that section 1981 stemmed from an act passed
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enforcement of contracts." These claims have not been resolved;
litigants have abandoned their section 1981 claims on appeal," or
the court has found it unnecessary to decide the claim.'3
This Note will evaluate the hypothesis that employment policies
which mandate suspension or discharge for multiple garnishments
are racially discriminatory. It will consider present methods of chal-
lenge, the lack of consensus between the courts and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the issues which
are emerging.
II. Historical Background and Present Methods of Suit
The controversy over the racial impact of employers' garnishment
policies is a recent one. Almost no cases can be found before the
1970s. This situation can be explained by several facts. The federal
government prohibits racial discrimination in employment through
two major statutes: Title VII 4 and section 1981.15 Title VII was not
enacted until 1964. Section 1981 had become a forgotten statute
until the 1967 Supreme Court decision of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 16 Finally, controversies over garnishment practices were often
in furtherance of the thirteenth amendment, the Court stated that it could apply to private
discrimination as well. Id.
10. Until the very recent Supreme Court case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976), there was considerable controversy whether section 1981 protected
white persons as well as minorities. McDonald rejected the viewpoint which held that because
of the phrase "as enjoyed by white citizens," see note 9 supra, the rights mentioned in section
1981 would only accrue to members of racial minorities. 427 U.S. at 286-27. After an exhaus-
tive study of section 1981's legislative history, the Court held that the benefits of section 1981
were available to whites as well as minorities. Id. at 295-96.
11. See Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Comment, Selecting a
Remedy for Private Racial Discrimination: Statutes in Search of Scope, 4 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 303 (1976).
12. Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g 10 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1233 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974), revg 363
F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
13. Terry v. International Harvester Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 905 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
15. Id. § 1981 (1970).
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Apparently, before 1967, section 1981 had fallen into disuse. Jones
concerned a claim of racial discrimination in the sale of property under section 1982. Id. at
412. In a brief aside from the central question of the scope and constitutionality of section
1982, Id. at 412, the Court addressed itself to the origin of section 1981, indicating that it
derived from section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, not solely from the Civil Rights Act of
1870, as had often been alleged. Id. at 441-42 n.78. This was significant since it opened the
door to claims that, because section 1981 was based on the thirteenth amendment, it could
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settled by arbitration in the 1960s.17
The focus, scope, and procedures of Title VII and section 1981 are
very different. Title VII is not concerned with racial discrimination
alone. Instead, it provides a comprehensive scheme "to assure
equality of employment opportunity by eliminating those practices
and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."'" Its prohibitions apply to employers in in-
dustries affecting commerce which have fifteen or more employees.
Title VII also extends to state and local governments"0 and certain
divisions of the federal government.21 It does not extend to Indian
tribes2 and bona fide private membership clubs. 3
Before an aggrieved party may prosecute a suit under Title VII,
he must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with
the EEOC24 and wait for a preliminary attempt at conciliation and
persuasion.25 Once the litigant brings suit, the court may appoint an
attorney for him,26 dispense with court costs, 7 or award attorneys'
fees should he prevail." If a violation of Title VII is proven, the court
may order any affirmative action it deems necessary and may
award back pay30 for the two years prior to the filing of the com-
plaint with the EEOC.31 Some authority holds that neither compen-
satory (other than back pay) nor punitive damages may be re-
covered under Title VII.32
In contrast to the broad sweep but cumbersome procedures of
be used to combat racial discrimination in private employment. See Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 5483 (1969)(McPherson,
Arb.); Union Carbide Corp., 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 5924 (1964)(Donaldson, Arb.).
18. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V, 1975), amending § 2000e (1970); see also Day v. Mathews,
530 F.2d 1083, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1970).
23. Id. § 2000e(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1970).
24. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
26. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
29. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975).
NOTES
Title VII, section 1981 attempts, with minimal procedural limita-
tions, to eliminate racial discrimination solely in the area of con-
-tracts.3 3 Because courts consider the employer-employee relation-
ship a contractual one, they have extended section 1981 to both
public3 and private35 employment situations.3 6
A litigant employing section 1981 need not exhaust administra-
tive remedies through the EEOC before he files suit.37 However, he
may not avail himself of the statutory benefits of Title VII. There
are no provisions for appointment of counsel, dispensation of court
costs, or recovery of attorneys' fees .3 But a section 1981 claimant
may obtain compensatory and punitive damages, and unrestricted
recovery of back pay-benefits possibly unavailable to Title VII
litigants. 39
Despite differences between the two statutes, the criteria used to
determine their violation through racial discrimination are the
same. 0 The test was laid down by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.4 Where a plaintiff can establish that an employ-
ment practice, even though neutral on its face, has a dispropor-
tionate effect on a racial group, Griggs holds that there is a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination.42 Unless the employer can
prove that the practice is required by business necessity, the plain-
tiff will recover.4 3 To operate as a business necessity, the employ-
ment practice must be related to job performance."
There is some indication in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,45 that
more than a disproportionate effect must be shown before a seem-
ingly neutral employment practice can be labeled discriminatory."
33. Id. at 459.
34. See Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
35. Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
36. See note 11 supra.
37. Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1975).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
39. Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
40. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1971).
41. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Court held defendant's facially neutral employ-
ment test discriminatory because the effect of the test was to deny blacks equal hiring and
promotional opportunities. Id. at 431-32.
42. Id. at 430-31.
43. Id. at 431.
44. Id.
45. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
46. Id. at 408.
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In a brief aside from the central question of sex discrimination pre-
sented by General Electric's pregnancy disability policy,47 the Su-
preme Court seemed to indicate that some showing of intent may
be necessary to violate Title VII. 4s However, the Court's comment
is very cryptic, and it is too early to tell whether General Electric
will undermine the strict standards of Griggs.
There is a dearth of case law under section 1981 with respect to
employers' garnishment practices. Although no explanation is ever
offered as to why section 1981 is dropped by litigants49 or ignored"
by courts, the reason may lie in the greater flexibility of benefits
offered under Title VII.5' Absent decisions under section 1981, the
discriminatory nature of such employment policies may be exam-
ined through a discussion of suits decided under Title VII.
III. Federal Cases Interpreting Title VII
The earliest Title VII suit was Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America.52
Plaintiff black warehouseman was dismissed for failing to obey a
company rule 3 against garnishments on employee wages. 4 He con-
ceded that defendant never meant to engage in racial discrimina-
tion, but asserted that the actual effect of the rule was to discrimi-
nate against blacks." The federal district court accepted plaintiff's
contention" as to the discriminatory effect for several reasons.
Utilizing the Griggs approach, the court first inquired whether the
company policy had a disproportionate effect on defendant's black
47. Id. at 404.
48. Id. at 408. The court merely stated:
[Ojur cases recognize that a prima facie violation . . . can be established in some
circumstances [emphasis added] upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially
neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against the member of one class or
another . . . . Even assuming that it is not necessary in this case to prove intent to
establish a prima facie violation . . . the respondents have not made the requisite
showing of gender-based effects.
Id.; see also comments in the concurring opinions by Justices Stewart and Blackmun, Id. at
413, and in the dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 417.
49. See note 12 supra.
50. See note 13 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra.
52. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
53. Company Rule 6 stated: "Conduct your personal finances in such a way that garnish-
ments will not be made on your wages." Id. at 492.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
NOTES
employees. 7 No statistics had been offered to show that defendant
had discharged more black employees than white employees be-
cause of a no garnishment rule. However, the court relied on several
studies58 to conclude that minority groups suffered more from wage
garnishment than whites.59 Judge Warren J. Ferguson attributed
this result to the over-representation of minorities in the "lower
social and economic segments of our society." 0 Having concluded
that such wage garnishment policies were apt to have a dispropor-
tionate effect on minority employees, the court addressed itself to
the second element of the Griggs formula: the defense of business
necessity.
Defendant asserted that business necessity justified its practice."'
The expense and time needed for its clerical staff to attend to gar-
nishment claims, and the loss of efficiency by garnished employees
mandated the policy."2 The court rejected defendant's argument."
Conceding that the boundaries of the Griggs concept of business
necessity were uncertain, the court nevertheless chose to make
the standard used in Griggs an exclusive consideration, and to hold
that a practice not related to the employee's ability to perform his
job properly, could not be justified by business necessity. 5 Thus,
considerations of inconvenience and cost were unacceptable." Fi-
nally, the court gave slight attention to defendant's claim that gar-
nished employees were apt to be less efficient since they were not
receiving the fruits of their labor. 7 The court deemed such a hypoth-
57. Id. at 494.
58. WESTERN CENTER OF LAW AND POVERTY, WAGE GARNISHMENT, IMPACT AND EXTENT IN
Los ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles, 1970); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
59. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
60. Id. According to the Bureau of the Census, in 1970, 34 percent of black families and
unrelated individuals had incomes below the "low" income line, while only 10 percent of
white families and unrelated individuals did. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM., THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1970).
61. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
65. 332 F. Supp. at 495. The soundness of this narrow formulation was criticized by many
commentators. See Comment, Title VII: Discriminatory Results and the Scope of Business
Necessity, 35 LA. L. REV. 146, 153 (1974); 85 HAv. L. REv. 1482, 1484-85 (1972); 37 Mo. L.
REV. 705, 707 (1972).
66. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
67. Id.
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esis speculative, and declined to adopt it."
Johnson was the first case to hold that employment practices
requiring disciplinary sanctions for garnished employees were viola-
tive of Title VII. Other suits quickly ensued.
In Wallace v. Debron Corp.,"° a black welder, who was discharged
when his wages were garnished twice within one year,7" alleged that
the dismissal was due to a racially discriminatory employment prac-
tice in violation of section 1981, and Title VII.1' Declaring that
plaintiff had failed to show a racially discriminatory practice, the
district court dismissed both claims.72
On appeal, plaintiff pursued only the Title VII claim.7 The
Eighth Circuit reversed. 7' It rejected the district court's conclusion
that Title VII was inconsistent with the garnishment restrictions
embodied in the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. 7 The
court of appeals also declined to adopt the defendant's interpreta-
tion of Griggs that facially neutral policies, not perpetuating racial
discrimination, were not violative of Title VII.7' Although the defen-
dant had admitted the adverse racial impact of its employment
practice on appeal, 77 the court of appeals seemed to base its decision
on an EEOC determination7" which had adopted the Johnson7
holding."0 Reasoning that many blacks were poor and thus more
likely to be garnished than whites, the EEOC had declared
discriminatory an employment practice similar to the one in
Debron.8 ' While never explicitly endorsing the hypothesis of the
EEOC determination, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless went on to
consider the defense of business necessity. This would seem to
indicate that it believed a prima facie case had been established.
68. Id.
69. 363 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
70. Id.
71. 363 F. Supp. at 838.
72. Id. at 839.
73. 494 F.2d 674, 675 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974).
74. Id. at 677.
75. Id. at 676-77.
76. Id. at 675-76.
77. Id. at 675.
78. EEOC Decision No. 74-27, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248 (1973).
79. 332 F. Supp. at 490.
80. 494 F.2d at 675 n.4.
81. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1248-49.
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NOTES
Defendant in Debron asserted the same justifications for its em-
ployment practice as did the defendant in Johnson. Perhaps aware
of prior judicial disinclination to accept claims of cost and inconve-
nience, the defendant emphasized its belief that garnishment re-
sulted in decreased employee efficiency. 3
The court of appeals formally disavowed any intent to set further
guidelines for determining business necessity.84 Nevertheless, it pro-
posed a new standard. To satisfy the defense of business necessity,
the court declared an employer must show not only that "its gar-
nishment policy fosters employee productivity . . . [but also] that
there is no . . . acceptable alternative that will accomplish that
goal 'equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.' "85 Stating
that a factual question remained with respect to the business ne-
cessity of defendant's policy, the court held the granting of sum-
mary judgment erroneous, 8 and remanded the case for a considera-
tion of the business necessity defense.87
Defendant in Debron conceded the racially discriminatory nature
of its employment practice. 8 In spite of this concession, the court
of appeals seemed to predicate its decision on the Johnson hypothe-
sis that minorities, because they are poor, are more likely to suffer
garnishment than whites .8 Although not wholeheartedly endorsing
the Johnson test of business necessity, 0 the court of appeals devised
a stricter standard. Not only must the employer's practice foster
productivity, but there must be no alternative which would accom-
plish the same goal with less racial impact." The Eighth Circuit in
Debron thus appears to have found that garnishment policies will
82. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
83. 494 F.2d at 677.
84. Id.
85. Id. This new standard appears to be an amalgam of the Johnson requirements of
relation to job performance, 332 F. Supp. at 495, and a formula espoused in the prior Eighth
Circuit decision of United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1972)(en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973). There, the court declared: "The system
in question must not only foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal."
464 F.2d at 308.
86. 494 F.2d at 677.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 675.
89. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
90. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
91. 494 F.2d at 677.
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be violative of Title VII unless the defendant can prove that its
practice is justified by overwhelming business necessity.
The reasoning employed by the courts in Johnson" and Debron"
has not been universally accepted. One court ignored it altogether. 4
Others adamantly declined to adopt it."
In Terry v. International Harvester Co.," the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana confronted a factual
situation similar to that in Johnson" and Debron."s A black em-
ployee had been 'suspended for two months for violation of a com-
pany policy against garnishments.9 He asserted that both the em-
ployer and union which had negotiated the policy had violated Title
VII since such a policy had a disproportionate effect on blacks. 00 In
a very brief opinion, the court ignored both the Johnson and Debron
cases. 0' Since it could find no racial irregularities in the application
of the policy due to the absence of discriminatory intent, the court
concluded that the practice did not violate Title VII.' °2 Yet Griggs
specifically held that the consequences of an employment practice,
not the intent behind it, should be determinative of a Title VII
violation.'I
In Robinson v. City of Dallas,'0 4 the Fifth Circuit rejected the
Johnson'5 formula. Plaintiff had resigned after being suspended for
disobeying a city personnel rule requiring the payment of "just
debts.""' He was not actually garnished, since the Texas Constitu-
tion forbids garnishment.' 7 However, after his creditor notified the
92. 332 F. Supp. at 490.
93. 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
94. See text accompanying notes 96-103 infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 104-23 infra.
96. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 905 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
97. See notes 52-68 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 69-91 supra and accompanying text.
99. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 906.
100. Id.
101. Terry was decided on August 26, 1974. Id. at 905. This was after both Debron, which
came down on March 28, 1974, and Johnson, which was decided in 1971.
102. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 907.
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also text accompanying notes
45-48 supra.
104. 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1233 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
105. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
106. 514 F.2d at 1272.
107. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28.
[Vol. V
NOTES
city that a debt was outstanding, plaintiff was suspended.' Assert-
ing a constructive discharge, plaintiff alleged violations' 0 of section
1981 and Titles VI" 0 and VII"' of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
district court, finding no evidence of racial discrimination, held for
the defendant."'
On appeal, plaintiff abandoned all claims except that under Title
VII."13 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the no discrimination finding",
and rejected both of plaintiff's methods of proof. Acknowledging
that statistics alone may be sufficient to prove a prima facie case,"'
the court found that the statistics involving persons actually disci-
plined under the city policy"0 were insufficient to prove that the
employment practice had a disproportionate effect on blacks."7 The
court then addressed plaintiff's second theory, i.e. the syllogism
engendered by Johnson. "I Plaintiff offered the following argument:
(1) poor persons are more likely to be unable to pay their just debts
than the non-poor; (2) blacks comprise a disproportionate percen-
tage of the poor in Dallas; (3) thus, an employment practice which
disciplines those who fail to pay their just debts will have a dispro-
portionate effect on blacks."0
The court of appeals agreed that blacks were more likely to be
among the poor than whites.2 0 However, the court stated that the
plaintiff had failed to provide statistical evidence to prove his first
contention. 2' In addition, the court found the theory questionable
and refused to take judicial notice of such a phenomenon. 2 By
rejecting this formula, the Fifth Circuit indicated that concrete sta-
108. 514 F.2d at 1272 n.5.
109. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1234.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-4 (1970).
111. Id. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
112. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1234.
113. 514 F.2d at 1272.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1273.
116. Of the seven employees disciplined under the "just debts" rule of the City of Dallas
between 1965 and 1973, only three were black. Id.
117. Id.
118. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
119. 514 F.2d at 1273.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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tistical evidence of the discriminatory effect of employment poli-
cies would be required to establish a violation of Title VII.'
IV. EEOC Decisions
While the federal courts have differed in their acceptance of the
Johnson rationale, 2 ' the EEOC has consistently endorsed it. In
EEOC Decision No. 74-27, 25 complainant, a black male, charged his
employer with maintaining a discriminatory garnishment policy in
violation of Title VII.29 The EEOC found reasonable cause to be-
lieve the policy was discriminatory. 7 Alluding to a survey, which
appears to have been employed in Johnson, 2 the EEOC stated that
minority groups were more likely to suffer garnishment than whites
because they were more apt to be poor. 2 ' The commission then set
out a general rule: due to their disproportionate effect, any such
practices would in the future be in violation of Title VII, unless it
could be shown that they were supported by a bona fide business
necessity."9 The commission defined this as: "demonstrably related
to job performance and. . . otherwise predicated and supported by
considerations of business necessity. ' ' 31
Another commission decision, EEOC Decision No. 74-34, 132
openly endorsed the Johnson formula.'3 The commission also indi-
cated that a business necessity would be very unlikely for such
policies, since "the charging party, who had incurred several prior
garnishments, and was employed for fifteen years. . . strongly sug-
gests that garnishments are in no way related to successful job per-
formance or that they affect efficiency or safety.'1 34
V. Conclusion
An analysis of the case law and decisions of the EEOC indicates
123. Id.
124. See 332 F. Supp. at 494.
125. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248 (1973).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1249.
128. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
129. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1249.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1249 (1973).
133. Id. at 1250.
134. Id.
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that a Title VII violation will occur only when the Johnson'35 reason-
ing is adopted. Otherwise, there is usually insufficient evidence to
indicate the bias or non-bias of these policies in individual cases. In
Johnson, no company-wide statistics were offered. The discrmina-
tory impact was assessed only through the acceptance of generic
studies. While the defendant in Debron was willing to concede the
discriminatory effect of its practice, 3 ' no statistics were offered. The
court seemed to justify its decision on the basis of EEOC Decision
No. 74-27,"1 which was itself an adaptation of the reasoning in
Johnson. I
In Robinson v. City of Dallas,3 ' the actual statistics offered were
inconclusive,'40 and the court based its finding of no discrimination
on the rejection of the broad Johnson hypothesis.'' The decision in
Terry v. International Harvester' was poorly reasoned and ignored
the question of statistical evidence completely. But both EEOC
decisions on point, No. 74-2711 and No. 74-34,'" apparently based
their conclusions on the Johnson syllogism, not on any individual
statistics.
Because both the judicial and EEOC decisions turn on the reason-
ing set forth in Johnson, it becomes imperative to examine the
accuracy of this syllogism. The most tenuous link in the Johnson
chain is the premise that the poor are more likely to be garnished
than the non-poor. There is ample evidence to document the second
premise that minorities are more apt to be poor than whites.' 5 A
recent study,'46 by the same author relied upon by the Johnson
court,'47 documents, albeit with rather dated statistics, the pre-
sumption that the poor are more likely to be garnished than the non-
poor.
135. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
136. 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 675 n.4.
138. See 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248, 1249 (1973).
139. 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 1273.
141. Id.
142. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 905 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
143. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248 (1973).
144. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1249 (1973).
145. See note 60 supra.
146. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 6.
147. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
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In a 1967111 survey of 1,33111 defaulting debtors' in the cities of
New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia,' the author found
that income was a significant factor in default.'52 The data showed
that 78 percent of those defaulting had annual incomes of less than
$8,000, while only 54 percent of non-farm families had incomes of
less than $8,000.11 Although the survey concerned defaulting debt-
ors in general, and was not restricted to those who were garnished,'54
it does indicate that persons who fail to pay their debts tend to be
poorer than the general population. In addition, a comparison of the
occupational status of persons in the survey who actually were gar-
nished, indicated that those who occupied lower positions on the job
scale were more likely to be garnished.'55 Since job status is ordinar-
ily related to income earned, this further points to the conclusion
that the poor tend to be garnished more frequently than the non-
poor.
The racial breakdown of the survey showed a much higher percen-
tage of minorities affected by garnishment than whites. Of the debt-
ors surveyed, 50 percent of the blacks and 59 percent of the Puerto
Ricans had been subject to garnishment. Only 36 percent of the
whites had been garnished.' Thus, the Johnson syllogism would
seem to be accurate, and employment practices which penalize
workers who are garnished would appear to have a disproportionate
effect on minorities.
The remaining question is the issue of business necessity. The
courts and the EEOC have not yet decided the appropriate stan-
dard. If the criteria advocated by the Johnson court are used, gar-
148. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 6, at 325.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Defaulting debtors were defined as those who failed to keep up with their credit
payments. Id. at 1.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id. at 14.
153. Id. See Table 2.1. Id.
154. This is especially true in Philadelphia, one of the cities surveyed, where no garnish-
ment is allowed. Id. at 227.
155. Id. at 233. Of the high white collar debtors (professionals, technical and managerial
personnel, officials and proprietors) surveyed, 37 percent had been garnished, as compared
with 46 percent among lower white collar workers (clerical and sales personnel). Among the
higher blue collar debtors (craftsmen and foremen) surveyed, 52 percent had been garnished
and 48 percent of the lower blue collar debtors (operatives, private household, service and
non-farm laborers) suffered the same fate. Id. at 17, 233.
156. Id.
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nishment policies will violate Title VII, unless they can be shown
to relate to an employee's ability to perform his job effectively.'57
The EEOC, in EEOC Decision No. 74-34, "1 has indicated its skepti-
cism that garnishment will ever impair an employee's job perform-
ance.'59 However, the EEOC seems to favor some consideration of
the cost and inconvenience to the employer."" The Eighth Circuit
requires an even more formidable showing."' Not only must the
practice be job related, but there must be no acceptable alternative
with a lesser racial impact.' 2 Until a consensus is reached, it will
be exceedingly difficult to determine whether such policies violate
Title VII and section 1981.
The legality of such employment practices is therefore left uncer-
tain. At present, it would seem that adequate proof can be made
that they have a disproportionate effect on minority employees. Yet,
if a satisfactory showing of business necessity is presented, they will
not be violative of Title VII or section 1981. What will be a satisfac-
tory showing will continue to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The trend, however, is toward finding such practices racially sus-
pect, and employers who maintain such policies would be wise to
reconsider them.
Amy S. Vance
157. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
158. 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1249 (1973).
159. Id. at 1250.
160. See EEOC Decision No. 74-27, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248, 1249 (1973).
161. See Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
162. Id. at 677.
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